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The Interplay of Networking Activities and Internal Knowledge Activities for Subsidiary 
Influence within MNCs 
 
Abstract 
Knowledge-based and network-based activities are known determinants of foreign subsidiary 
influence. We demonstrate that the interaction between these factors is essential in understanding 
how subsidiaries gain influence within an MNC. We test this using data on 184 foreign-owned 
subsidiaries in the UK. The results indicate that the possession of strategic resources (knowledge or 
embedded relations) increases subsidiary influence only when the knowledge is transferred back to 
headquarters. Importantly, the impact of subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness, external 
embeddedness and knowledge development on influence is mediated by the extent of reverse 
knowledge transfer. This mediating role sheds new light on the antecedents to subsidiary influence.   
Keywords: Influence, Reverse Knowledge Transfer (RKT), knowledge development, 
embeddedness, knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) 
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1- Introduction 
The contemporary multinational corporation (MNC) is frequently described as an integrated 
network where foreign subsidiaries have transcended being mere implementers of headquarters 
strategies and increasingly contribute knowledge that can improve the competitive advantage of the 
MNC as a whole (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998; Rugman & Verbeke, 
2001). The implication of this is that the subsidiary is considered a potential strategic partner that 
can play an active role in the success of the MNC (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Franko, 1989). 
Therefore, in modern MNCs the relationship between subsidiaries and headquarters has been 
described as more federative and less hierarchical (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007; Ghoshal & 
Bartlett, 1990; Handy, 1992; Provan, 1983), with the main issues, compared to earlier depictions of 
MNCs, being influence, power and dependency. 
Extant studies on subsidiary influence phenomena have stated that network characteristics, e.g. 
embeddedness (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Andersson et al., 2007), explain subsidiary 
influence in the MNC without providing a clear picture of how the network (knowledge) resources 
are developed and made available to headquarters. Other studies (see e.g. Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, & 
Kappen, 2011; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004) have shown that the development of knowledge and its 
diffusion within the MNC is a pivotal characteristic in explaining subsidiary influence, without 
giving ample weight to how network particularities influence its usefulness and value for the 
headquarters. 
This paper aims to expand our understanding of why some subsidiaries are more influential than 
others. Our aim is to provide a more holistic view of subsidiary influence by simultaneously 
investigating how both network- and knowledge-based activities can enable subsidiaries to exert 
influence on their MNCs. Therefore, our model utilizes both activities as a departure point. In our 
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research, network-based activities comprise external embeddedness and subsidiary-headquarters 
embeddedness, and knowledge-based activities consist of knowledge development and Reverse 
Knowledge Transfer (RKT). Because of the close association between the former and the latter 
(Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2001; Birkinshaw, Hood, & Jonsson, 1998), we also examine the 
mediating role of knowledge-based activities on the relationship between network-based activities 
and influence. 
Our study makes two main contributions. First, we examine the direct impacts of knowledge- and 
network-based activities on the extent to which a subsidiary can exert influence on the strategic 
decisions of its MNC. So far, from the literature we know that both of these factors can be strong 
predictors of subsidiary influence (Ambos, Andersson, & Birkinshaw, 2010; Andersson et al., 2007; 
Birkinshaw, Hood, & Young, 2005). However, our knowledge of how these two sets of activities 
interact in the context of subsidiary influence is limited. The present research addresses this 
limitation by focusing specifically on the relationship between network-based activities and internal 
knowledge-based activities. Our theoretical contribution is therefore to provide empirical evidence 
on the mediating role of knowledge-based activities. Moreover, a number of earlier studies suggest 
that subsidiary influence can be explained by its network-based activities; however, this has been 
investigated mainly in relation to external embeddedness (Andersson et al., 2007). While the 
literature suggests that it is important to look at subsidiary-headquarters relationships when 
investigating subsidiary influence (Birkinshaw et al., 2005), this association has not been 
empirically investigated. Our research contributes to an enhanced understanding of how network-
based activities regarding headquarters and external environment help a subsidiary to increase its 
influence in the MNC. 
The paper is organized as follows. After discussing the related theoretical background, we develop 
hypotheses regarding factors impacting on subsidiary influence. We then test our hypotheses using 
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structural equation modelling (SEM) via the use of LISREL. Our paper concludes with a discussion 
of key findings and implications for further research. 
 
2- Theoretical background 
The modern MNC has moved away from a headquarters focus towards an increasing role for 
individual subsidiaries (Buckley & Strange, 2011; Yamin & Andersson, 2011). The internalization 
theory suggests that firms establish overseas when they possess intangible assets and capabilities, 
but recent trends have highlighted the growing dispersal of knowledge creation within MNC 
networks with the rise of subsidiary-specific advantages (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2001). Thus, the role of subsidiaries has shifted from mere implementers to shapers of 
MNC strategies (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005; Rugman & Verbeke, 
2001). This means that, on the one hand, sub-units become more capable of developing 
competencies and less dependent on the intangible resources of their headquarters (Andersson et al., 
2007; Ranjay Gulati, 1998; McEvily & Zaheer, 1999), whilst on the other hand they remain highly 
embedded within their MNC network (Yamin & Andersson, 2011). Studies investigating subsidiary 
influence have often conceptualized the MNC as a federation where there is an ongoing power 
contest between headquarters and subsidiary (specifically established ones) (Ambos et al., 2010; 
Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004).  
This drive for power within an organization can be explained by resource-dependency theory, 
which suggests that a focal company can enjoy resource-based power when it possesses or controls 
strategic resources that may make others dependent upon them (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Within 
the context of the MNC network, managers of subsidiarLHVZLVKWRUDLVHWKHLUILUP¶VLQIOXHQFHLQWKH
MNC network because of rent-seeking behaviour (Ciabuschi et al., 2011) or control avoidance, so 
that they can gain more independence and autonomy in their strategic actions (Andersson et al., 
2007, P: 803). We therefore suggest that subsidiaries have an interest in developing their influence 
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in the MNC network. For managers iQ KHDGTXDUWHUV LQGLYLGXDO VXEVLGLDULHV¶ LQIOXHQFH PDWWHUV
because it raises their potential for opportunistic behaviour. Indeed, differentiation assists 
subsidiaries to pursue objectives that are not necessarily in congruence with those of their 
headquarters (Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006; Holm & Pedersen, 2000). From a resource-
dependence perspective, headquarters cannot fully evade a degree of dependence on their 
subsidiaries, as the latter have become key knowledge harvesters in host environments. 
In the international business literature, subsidiary relations have been consistently emphasized as a 
key source of power (Andersson et al., 2002; Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998). However, most of these 
contributions focus on the characteristics of subsidiary relations with the local environment 
(external embeddedness), and so far only limited consideration has been given to the characteristics 
of relationships between a subsidiary and its headquarters. From a knowledge-based perspective, 
VWXGLHV KDYH GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW KHDGTXDUWHUV DWWHQWLRQ DQG UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH VXEVLGLDU\¶V
knowledge leads to enhanced influence (Ambos et al., 2010). However, within a differentiated 
QHWZRUN VWUXFWXUH UHODWLRQDO DVSHFWV PDWWHU DQG KHDGTXDUWHUV¶ DWWHQWLRQ LV UHODWHG WR LQWHUQDO
embeddedness (Yamin & Andersson, 2011). This is because valuable knowledge is often tacit and 
difficult to transfer, recognize and absorb (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Rogers & Larsen, 1984; 
Szulanski, 1996). Hence, through facilitating the absorptive capacity of the headquarters, the 
closeness of the subsidiary-headquarters relationship has considerable impact on the extent to which 
subsidiary competencies (e.g. external embeddedness and knowledge development) can serve as 
platforms for influence. 
Typically, studies have looked at subsidiary power and influence being dependent on resources 
either in terms of networking activities (e.g. external embeddedness in Andersson et al., 2002) or 
knowledge-based activities (e.g. transfer competence in Ciabuschi et al., 2011). However, in the 
extant literature on subsidiaries, there exists abundant evidence indicating a strong association 
between the former and latter (Andersson et al., 2001; Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, & Tihanyi, 
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2004).  Consequently, given that these two types of activities are increasingly interrelated, we argue 
that, in order to provide a holistic overview of subsidiary influence, they should be considered 
simultaneously. 
There are two key novelties in the model we propose (see Figure 1). First, we integrate recent 
findings in the literature that emphasise the importance of dual embeddedness (Figueiredo, 2011) in 
OHDGLQJ WR D VXEVLGLDU\¶V LQQRYDWLYHQHVV DV ZHOO DV WKH FRPSOHPHQWDU\ UROH RI VXEVLGLDU\- 
headquarters and external embeddedness when explaining knowledge development by subsidiaries 
and reverse knowledge transfer (Andersson et al., 2001; Håkanson & Nobel, 2001; Najafi-Tavani, 
Giroud, & Sinkovics, 2012a). For this reason, we propose that influence can best be explained when 
considering both types of embeddedness (external embeddedness as well as subsidiary-headquarters 
embeddedness). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Secondly, our model answers recent calls by scholars citing the need to provide a holistic view to 
explain subsidiary influence (Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006). In our model, subsidiary 
influence is linked to both knowledge-based activities (knowledge development and reverse 
knowledge transfer) and network-based activities (external embeddedness and subsidiary-
headquarters embeddedness), but we also propose a mediating effect of knowledge-based activities 
when linking embeddedness to influence. This is because, while external embeddedness and 
knowledge development represent strategic resources, subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness and 
reverse knowledge transfer (knowledge transfer from subsidiary to headquarters) represent micro-
political bargaining power (Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006). This 
means a subsidiary gains influence through lobbying its skills, engaging in issue-selling activities, 
or maintaining close relations with its headquarters (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 2005; Inkpen & Beamish, 
1997). 
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It is noteworthy to mention that in addition to internal factors such as network- and knowledge-
based activities, external factors such as national culture, host-country economic resources and 
location-VSHFLILF DGYDQWDJHV PD\ LPSDFW RQ VXEVLGLDULHV¶ LQIOXHQFH (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; 
Rugman & Collinson, 2009). For instance, through impacting on a subsidiary's performance and its 
ability to integrate into internal and external environments (Ghemawat, 2001; Kessapidou & 
Varsakelis, 2002), national cultures can indirectly influence a subsidiary's power-base. It has also 
been argued that subsidiaries tend to have a hierarchical structure in countries where decision-
making is centralized or managers tend to avoid uncertainty (Hofstede, 1980; Makino & Neupert, 
2000). Moreover, prior studies find strong association between subsidiary influence and the 
strategic importance of its local environment (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986, 1989). Subsidiaries 
operating in strategic locations are more influential, since they are more capable of performing a 
full range of value-chain activities, while others may have specific roles such as sales or 
manufacturing (Blumentritt, 2003). While we acknowledge the potential importance of external 
factors, considering the current above theoretical limitations in networks analysis and given that the 
main aim of this research is to further our understanding of how internal factors (here knowledge- 
and network-based activities) and their interactions impact on a subsidiary's power-base, these 
external factors are excluded from our study.    
 
3- Hypotheses 
3.1. Networking activities 
Networking activities comprise subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness and external embeddedness. 
Embeddedness refers to the mutual adaptation of activities between two firms (Andersson et al., 
2001; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). The literature has so far focused on the association between external 
embeddedness and influence (Andersson et al., 2002, 2007; Forsgren, Pedersen, & Foss, 1999). 
Subsidiaries with a high level of external embeddedness tend to have access to unique strategic 
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resources (Forsgren et al., 1999) on which headquarters may depend. Such competencies may 
represent unique knowledge resources, a major supplier, or an important customer that can be used 
by subsidiaries as a main source of bargaining power in political fights (Mudambi & Navarra, 
2004). Furthermore, it has been argued that subsidiaries that are externally embedded generally 
perform better and thus are in a stronger position to negotiate their MNC's future investment 
(Andersson et al., 2001, 2002).  
However, subsidiary influence exists not only in relation to external environment, but can also be 
observed in intra-firm activities. In particular, the impact of headquarters on subsidiary influence 
has been investigated from different perspectives: 'headquartHUV¶QHWZRUNNQRZOHGJH
(Andersson et 
al., 2007) 
KHDGTXDUWHUV¶ DWWHQWLRQ
 (Ambos et al., 2010), and subsidiary-headquarters negotiation 
(Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006). However, few studies, if any, precisely examine how 
subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness impacts on influence. Studies have found that subsidiaries 
exhibiting close relations with their headquarters are more powerful (Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, & 
Yamagishi, 1983). A high level of embeddedness can increase the ability of the headquarters to 
recognize the competencies residing in its subsidiary. Such recognisability can then be used by the 
subsidiary to gain more bargaining power (Mudambi & Navarra, 2004), to succeed in intra-
corporation competition for organizational resources (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998), or to augment its 
influence in the MNC's strategic decisions (Garcia-Pont, Canales, & Noboa, 2009; Yamin & 
Andersson, 2011)7KHUHIRUHDVXEVLGLDU\¶VH[WHQWRIQHWZRUNHPEHGGedness with its headquarters 
and local environment can potentially serve as sources of power (Andersson & Forsgren, 2000; 
Andersson et al., 2007). Thus, we hypothesize that: 
+\SRWKHVLV  $ VXEVLGLDU\¶V QHWZRUN-based activities (subsidiary-headquarters and external 
embeddedness) are positively related to influence. 
 
3.2. Knowledge-based activities  
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There exists a broad consensus in the international business literature that a subsidiary's ability to 
exert influence is closely associated with knowledge-based activities (Ambos et al., 2010; 
Andersson et al., 2007; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). Knowledge-based activities not only include a 
subsidiary's ability to develop new knowledge, but also refer to the extent to which it transfers 
knowledge to its headquarters (RKT). There is ample literature on the use of knowledge 
development for the strategic positioning of the subsidiary (for instance as a centre of excellence, 
Frost, Birkinshaw, & Ensign, 2002; Holm & Pedersen, 2000; Sumelius & Sarala, 2008). The 
rationale is that if a company brings critical competencies into a relationship, it will be more 
powerful (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). MNCs can strengthen competitive advantages by acquiring 
and integrating knowledge existing in different subsidiaries (Doz & Prahalad, 1984). This can lead 
to a situation of resource dependency, thereby increasing the influence of a subsidiary (Andersson 
et al., 2007; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). While earlier studies (e.g. 
Andersson et al., 2007) assert that knowledge development can increase a subsidiary's power-base, 
some factors point to a potentially negative association. First, the subsidiary may develop highly 
context-specific knowledge that may not be usable by other units of the MNC (Geppert & Matten, 
2006). In such circumstances, a subsidiary may lose bargaining power, because it has to engage in 
activities clarifying the usability of such knowledge for its headquarters and other units of the MNC 
(Forsgren, Johanson, & Sharma, 2000). Mudambi and Navarra (2004) assert that subsidiaries with 
large amounts of unusable knowledge have lower bargaining power, because the 'opportunity costs 
of marginalizing' such knowledge are low. Secondly, while a particular subsidiary may possess a 
competitive advantage that is also beneficial for the whole MNC, the value of such competencies 
may remain unrealized due to the nature of knowledge (e.g. tacitness and complexity) and/or the 
political structure of the corporation (Cantwell & Janne, 1999).  
A VXEVLGLDU\¶V UHVRXUFHV FDQ WKXV FRQWULEXWH WR LWV SRZHU-base only if they are recognizable and 
acknowledged by the headquarters (Prahalad & Doz, 1981). When the subsidiary frequently 
engages in RKT activities, its capabilities become more and more legitimate within the MNC, 
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which functions as a platform for the subsidiary's power (Schulz, 2001). RKT can also be used as a 
PHDQVRIGLUHFWLQJKHDGTXDUWHUV¶DWWHQWLRQWRWKHVXEVLGLDU\ZKLFKDJDLQOHDGVWRDQLQFUHDVHLQWKH
VXEVLGLDU\¶VLQIOXHQFH(Ambos et al., 2010). Arguably, there exist factors that restrain subsidiaries 
from transferring all their knowledge to the headquarters. Firstly, the nature of knowledge itself 
(e.g. tacitness and complexity), which can considerably affect the process of cross-border 
knowledge transfer, and which explains why subsidiaries find it difficult to transfer completely their 
knowledge resources to headquarters (Tallman & Chacar, 2011). Secondly, subsidiaries may fear 
losing a monopoly position if they engage in RKT (Foss & Pedersen, 2002). Keeping these 
considerations in mind, existing evidence still finds a positive relationship between knowledge-
based activities and influence. Thus, we hypothesize: 
+\SRWKHVLV  $ VXEVLGLDU\¶V NQRZOHGJH-based activities (knowledge development and RKT) are 
positively related to influence. 
 
3.3. Mediating effects 
Due to close association between knowledge-based and network-based activities, we argue that the 
relationship between networking activities and influence is mediated by knowledge-based activities 
within the MNC. Firstly, the literature has shown that the level of knowledge development is higher 
for those subsidiaries that have close embedded relationships with their headquarters and external 
business partners (Birkinshaw, 1996; Bresman, Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 2010; Buckley, Glaister, 
Klijn, & Tan, 2009; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Håkanson & Nobel, 2001). Embedded relationships serve 
as knowledge-gathering devices (Rogers & Larsen, 1984) that boost the ability of a subsidiary to 
develop new knowledge through increasing the accessibility of knowledge and new ideas, 
LQFUHDVLQJILUPV¶DELOLW\WRLGHQWLI\DQGDWWDLQNQRZOHGJHDQGUHGXFLQJWKHULVNDQGFRVWVDVVRFLDWHG
with exchange of resources (Andersson et al., 2007; R.  Gulati, 1999; Malmberg & Maskell, 2002). 
It should be noted that while knowledge resources existing in headquarters might not be as 
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influential as those of the local environment (Andersson et al., 2007), they can considerably 
augment the ability of subsidiaries to develop knowledge (Provan, 1983; Yamin, 1999). This is 
evidenced in Frost (2001), who demonstrates that subsidiaries with dual embeddedness are more 
capable of developing new knowledge than those with embedded relations only within their local 
environment. 
Secondly, earlier studies demonstrate that network-based activities can impact on RKT. Both 
subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness and external embeddedness can increase RKT, albeit in 
different ways. Subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness facilitates RKT through reducing the effects 
of motivational and cognitive problems (Szulanski, 1996), increasing willingness and learning 
capabilities (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Najafi-Tavani, Giroud, & Sinkovics, 2012b), and decreasing 
costs (Håkanson & Nobel, 2001). External embeddedness, however, alleviates RKT through 
facilitating knowledge development. The main idea is that a subsidiary should first be capable of 
developing new knowledge to be able to contribute to the knowledge base of its headquarters 
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000).  
For these reasons, we argue that network-based activities create the conditions for knowledge-based 
activities, and therefore we suggest that: 
+\SRWKHVLV  7KH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ D VXEVLGLDU\¶V QHWZRUN-based activities (subsidiary- 
headquarters and external embeddedness) and influence is mediated by knowledge-
based activities (knowledge development and RKT).  
In the next section, we provide details of the methodology adopted to test our hypotheses.  
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Sample and data collection 
12 
 
We test our hypotheses on a sample of subsidiaries from the United Kingdom knowledge-intensive 
business services (KIBS) sector. According to Miles (2005, p.40) .,%6 FRPSDQLHV DUH ³PDLQO\
concerned with providing knowledge-intensive inputs to the business processes of other 
RUJDQL]DWLRQV´2WKHUVFKRODUVFRQVLGHU.,%6FRPSDQLHVDVµEULGJHVRILQQRYDWLRQ¶EHWZHHQVFLHQFH
and manufacturing (Czarnitzki & Spielkamp, 2003; Koch & Strotmann, 2008). The survey was 
conducted amongst 'computer services', 'research and development', 'economic services', 'technical 
services' and 'advertising' companies, as these sub-sectors qualify as the most knowledge-intensive 
business services (KIBS) (Simmie & Strambach, 2006). 
Survey design and implementation were based on the tailored-design method (Dillman, 2000). To 
check its relevance and clarity, the survey was pre-tested on fifty subsidiaries, fifteen PhD students 
and selected academics. The FAME database (which provides company information for UK public 
and private companies) was used to draw up a random list of companies. Data were collected in 
early 2009 by online survey. In total, 523 managing directors, CEOs or general managers of 
subsidiaries were approached. After contacting respondents directly by phone, a personalized 
covering letter containing a link to the survey was emailed to them. In order to increase response 
rate, two follow-ups were done. 25 cases were removed for various reasons (e.g. more than 15% 
missing values or not having non-UK headquarters), leaving a sample size of 184, with a 35% 
response rate. 
Subsidiary size and age in the sample was quite diverse, averaging 5000 employees and fifteen 
years respectively. Headquarters were mainly located in Europe (43%) or North America (40%) and 
the rest in Asia, Australia, South America and Africa. Non-respond bias was tested by examining 
whether respondents and non-respondents differed systematically in terms of age, number of 
HPSOR\HHV DQGKHDGTXDUWHUV¶QDWLRQDOLW\ (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). No significant differences 
were found between responding and non-responding firms. We also compared early respondents 
with late respondents in terms of influence, knowledge development and RKT (Gerbing & 
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Anderson, 1988). The comparisons yielded no significant differences for any of the aforementioned 
variables, indicating that the respondents were representative of the entire sample. 
 
4.2. Construct Analysis 
To test the hypothesised relations, we use structural equation modelling (SEM), since it allows 
simultaneous assessment of multiple relations amongst dependent and independent constructs. We 
adapt the two-stage process (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988) using LISREL 8.8. In the first stage, the 
measurements are assessed by means of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). CFA enables us to 
assess the independence and homogeneity of a construct and their discriminant and convergent 
validity. In the second stage, a structural model is used to examine the hypothesized relations. In 
order to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we first investigate direct impacts of subsidiary-headquarters 
embeddedness, external embeddedness, knowledge development and RKT on influence. Indirect 
impacts of network-based activities on influence are then examined by testing the impacts of the 
former (subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness and external embeddedness) on knowledge-based 
activities (knowledge development and RKT). In other words, we test the association between 
subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness and knowledge development on one hand and RKT on the 
other. Similarly, the effects of external embeddedness on knowledge development and RKT will be 
tested. In what follows, we explain the operationalization of constructs. We then assess different 
types of validity.     
 
4.2.1. Influence 
The measures of influence are adapted from Andersson et al. (2007) and Ahituv and Carmi (2007). 
On a 7-SRLQWVFDOHDQFKRUHGLQµQRLQIOXHQFH¶DQGµH[WUHPHO\LQIOXHQWLDO¶UHVSRQGHQWVZHUH
asked to assess the influence that their company has on the decision-making of their MNCs. The 
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focus was on three types of decisions: new products/services, determining and changing prices of 
services, and expanding/diminishing activities. 
 
4.2.2. External embeddedness 
External embeddedness was measured by scales adapted from Lane and Lubatkin (1998), 
Andersson, Björkman, & Forsgren (2005), and Andersson et al. (2001). Respondents were asked to 
estimate the extent to which the relationship between their subsidiary and local actors (customers, 
suppliers, universities and research institutes) had caused mutual adaptation concerning sales and 
marketing practices, distribution practices and management systems and practices. All measures 
were based on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 'not at all' to 'to a very great extent'. 
 
4.2.3. Subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness 
Subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness was measured as the extent of mutual adoption of 
practices/activities (Andersson et al., 2005). Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which 
the relationship between their subsidiary and headquarters had caused mutual adaptation over a 
range of activities: sales and marketing practices, distribution practices, and management systems 
and practices (Andersson et al., 2005). A 7-SRLQW /LNHUW VFDOH ZDV XVHG DQFKRUHG LQ  µQR
LQIOXHQFH¶DQGµH[WUHPHO\LQIOXHQWLDO¶ 
 
4.2.4. Knowledge development 
Knowledge development was measured by four items, based on Andersson et al. (2005). 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which during the last three years their company 
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had developed knowledge superior to that of headquarters, sister companies or competitors. The 
focus was on four types of knowledge ± sales and marketing know-how; distribution know-how; 
service production strategy know-how; and management systems and practices know-how. All the 
questions were based on 7-point scale anchored in 1, 'not at all', to 7, 'to a very great extent'.  
 
4.2.5. Reverse knowledge transfer 
The operationalization of this construct was adapted from Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) and 
Yang, Mudambi, & Meyer (2008). On a 7-point scale ranging from 1, 'not at all', to 7 'to a very 
JUHDWH[WHQW
WKHVXEVLGLDU\¶VPDQDJHUZDs asked to estimate the extent to which, over the last three 
years, their subsidiary had transferred knowledge to the headquarters. Several types of knowledge 
were used: sales and marketing know-how, strategy know-how (knowledge about customers, 
suppliers and competitors), distribution know-how, and management systems and practices know-
how (Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Schulz, 2001). 
 
4.2.6. Control variables 
To assess the robustness of our proposed theoretical framework, we (a) include a control variable 
and (b) conduct a series of jack-knife tests for the binominal circumstances inherent in the data 
material (Chatfield, 1988)7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFKDVXEVLGLDU\¶VNQRZOHGJHLVWDFLWLVOLNHO\WRLPSDFW
upon its ability to exert influence on the strategic decisions of its headquarters. The more 
knowledge is tacit, the harder it is for headquarters to recognize and appreciate the potential of such 
capabilities. Consequently, we control for tacitness. On a 7-point scale (ranging from 1, 'fully 
disagree', to 7, 'fully agree'), managers were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or 
GLVDJUHHGZLWKWKHIROORZLQJVWDWHPHQW
RXU«NQRZOHGJHFDQEHHDVLO\GRFXPHQWHGLQPDQXDOVDQG
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reports'. The focus of the aforementioned questions was on four types of knowledge: sales and 
marketing; service production strategy; strategy; and management systems and practices. 
To control for country effects (at headquarters level), subsidiary size and age, we conduct a jack-
knife test. The natural logarithP RI WKH VXEVLGLDULHV¶ QXPEHU RI HPSOR\HHV DQG \HDU RI
HVWDEOLVKPHQWZHUHXVHGDVLQGLFDWRUVRIDVXEVLGLDU\¶VVL]HDQGDJH 
 
4.3. Model testing 
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to assess convergent and discriminant validity, using 
Fornell and Larcker's (1981) instructions. We assess convergent validity using t-values, factor 
loading and R2 values. As can be seen in Table 1, all R2 values (the linearity of relations between 
constructs and indicators) are strong and well above a cut-off point of 0.20 (Yamin & Andersson, 
2011). Furthermore, all t-values (the significance of each relation between constructs and 
indicators) are highly significant (all above 8.78), and all the factor loadings are strong (all above 
0.65). Moreover, we calculate the composite reliabilities (CRs) of all constructs, and all are above 
the threshold of 0.7 (ranging from 0.758 to 0.902) (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that all the constructs have good convergent validity, i.e. they are homogenous 
constructs.  
Discriminant validity was assessed through two different methods. First, we check whether the 
correlations and causal paths between the latent constructs are significantly different from 1 (Najafi-
Tavani et al., 2012a). The results indicate that, at 99.9% confidence interval, none of the 
correlations and causal paths are close to 1. Second, discriminant validly can be evaluated by 
comparing the values of the square root of AVE with the corresponding inter-construct correlation 
estimates (SIC). Given that all the values of the square root of AVE were larger than the 
corresponding SICs (Table 2), discriminant validity is not a problem in this study. Table 1 also 
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represents some information on the fit indices of the overall model. The overall chi-square is 
significant (F2= 282.01 (df=174); p-value=0.00), which can be explained by the statistics' sensitivity 
to sample size (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). However, other goodness-of-fit statistics (SRMR: 0.054, 
CFI= 0.96, NNFI= 0.96, IFI= 0.96, RMSEA= 0.058, ratio of chi-square to degree of freedom=1.62 
[less than 3]) meet all requirements, providing further evidence of the validity of the complete 
model (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). 
Although some precautions (e.g. ensuring anonymity, avoiding academic terms, providing 
explanations for ambiguous terms) were taken while designing and implementing the survey, 
collecting measures through the same instrument raises concerns about the influence of Common 
0HWKRG9DULDQFH&09RQWKHUHVXOWV7KHOLNHOLKRRGRI&09ZDVLQYHVWLJDWHGXVLQJ+DUPDQ¶V
one-factor test (Konrad & Linnehan, 1995). The results of the principal components factor analysis 
yielded six factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, which accounted for 75% of the variance, and 
with the first factor accounting for 28.9% of that. Therefore, it can be concluded that CMV is not a 
serious problem in this research (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Moreover, as recommended by 
Podsakoff, Mackenzie, & Lee (2003) and following a number of contributions (i.e. Ambos et al., 
2010; Iverson & Maguire, 2000), to test the possibility of CMV we also employed a more 
sophisticated method, the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) technique. This compares fit indices 
across models that vary in terms of complexity. If the fit indices of the simpler model are as good as 
the more complex model, it can be concluded that common method bias is a problem (Korsgaard & 
Roberson, 1995). Two models were developed, wherein the first model contained one construct and 
21 items and the second model contained six constructs and 21 items. Since the chi-square 
improved significantly from 1377.3 with 189 degrees of freedom (first model) to 282.01 with 174 
degrees of freedom in the second, it can be concluded that correlations across items are not driven 
purely by common method bias. 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
5. Results 
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) via the use of LISREL 8.8 was employed to test the proposed 
theoretical framework. Looking at Table 3, the results indicate that, in general, network-based 
activities have a positive impact on influence; however, neither external embeddedness nor 
subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness boost influence significantly (t-value= .59 and .8 
respectively). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is rejected.  
Regarding Hypothesis 2, the first notable result relates to the significant positive impact of RKT on 
influence (t-YDOXH   LH WKH VXEVLGLDU\¶V DELOLW\ WR H[HUW LQIOXHQFH RQ LWV 01&
V VWUDWHJLF
decisions depends heavily on the extent to which it contributes to the knowledge base of the 
headquarters. However, contrary to our expectation, the results do not support the relationship 
between knowledge development and influence (t-value= -1. 58). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is only 
partially supported.  
Given that knowledge development is theoretically linked to RKT, we further checked whether the 
former impacts on influence indirectly through the latter. As expected, the results indicate that the 
association between knowledge development and influence is significantly mediated by the extent 
of RKT (t-value= 5.24).  
Following Hypothesis 3, we checked whether the relation between network-based activities and 
influence is mediated by knowledge-based activities. As can be seen in Table 3, the association 
between subsidiary-headquarters embeddedness and influence is mediated by RKT with t-value= 
2.54 and knowledge development with t-value= 2.23. Furthermore, the relationship between 
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external embeddedness and influence is mediated by knowledge development with t-value= 4.92. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
To test the robustness of the proposed conceptual framework, we conducted a number of jack-knife 
tests (Ambos et al., 2010)7KHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWRIKHDGTXDUWHUV¶ORFDWLRQZDVDVVHVVHGE\RPLWWLQJ
all subsidiaries with US, French or German headquarters. In none of the analyses did the factor 
loading differ outside one standard error (Table 4). The same procedure was repeated for subsidiary 
size (large and small) and age (old and young). The top 15% of largest/smallest subsidiaries and the 
top 15% of oldest/youngest subsidiaries were removed. In none of the four runs of the model is 
there a change in factor loading outside one standard error. In addition, with regard to tacitness, we 
first checked the proposed theoretical model, and in the second stage we introduced tacitness as the 
control variable. The results indicate that tacitness does not significantly impact on influence. We 
also find no significant changes in the results of the hypothesis testing. Taken together, our 
proposed theoretical framework is very robust, and the causal relations remain significant even in 
different sub-samples.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
6. Conclusions and discussions  
Our research offers important contributions. The main contribution is to show that within different 
knowledge-based activities, RKT is most important in explaining influence. This is the most 
interesting finding, since it indicates that developing new knowledge is not enough for subsidiaries 
to gain influence, which implies that subsidiaries should engage in showcasing and issue-selling 
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activities (RKT). Our second contribution is to confirm that explanatory factors cannot be studied in 
isolation (Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2006). We demonstrate that when including both 
knowledge- and network-based activities in the model simultaneously, the impact of the latter on 
influence fades away. However, following our analysis, networking activities are still very 
important in determining subsidiary power-base, as they may result in the creation of unique 
competencies which can function as sources of power. Particularly, we show that, through 
facilitating knowledge development and RKT, such activities indirectly but significantly enhance 
influence. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Our final contribution resides in providing insights for subsidiaries operating in the KIBS sector. 
 
6.1. Specific findings related to subVLGLDULHV¶LQIOXHQFHZLWKLQWKH.,%6VHFWRU 
Our results demonstrate that subsidiaries in the KIBS sector can augment their influence within 
MNCs, but only when engaging in RKT activities. RKT can be considered as issue-selling 
activities, wherein subsidiarLHVWU\WRJDLQSRZHUWKURXJKGLUHFWLQJKHDGTXDUWHUV¶DWWHQWLRQWRWKHLU
unique sources of knowledge (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 2005). This result is also supported by findings 
from earlier studies (Forsgren & Pedersen, 2000; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). The nature of 
knowledge existing in the KIBS sector hampers the ability of headquarters to fully appreciate the 
value of knowledge existing in their sub-units. This is why RKT plays an important role in this 
sector, as a means through which subsidiaries can augment their influence, since RKT leads to 
headquarters recognising and acknowledging the value of knowledge created and existing in their 
sub-units.  
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It has been asserted that subsidiaries possessing unique sources of knowledge are more influential 
(Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). However, our results not only disconfirm the link between knowledge 
development and influence, but also point to the possibility of a negative association between these 
two factors. The findings of a number of earlier studies also indicate that the development of a 
sXEVLGLDU\¶VNQRZOHGJHEDVHFDQFUHDWHWHQVLRQ(Asakawa, 2001). Increases in the knowledge base 
of a subsidiary can boost its influence on the strategic decisions of the MNC when applicable to 
other parts of the MNC (Forsgren & Pedersen, 2000). It has been shown that developing knowledge 
at the expense of transferring it to other parts of the MNC or assisting in utilizing it may weaken a 
VXEVLGLDU\¶V SRVLWLRQ (Forsgren et al., 2000). Our results imply that the relationship between 
knowledge development and influence is strongly mediated by the extent of RKT. This finding is in 
some way mirrored in Ambos et al. (2010), where they demonstrate that through attracting 
KHDGTXDUWHUV¶DWWHQWLRQDVXEVLGLDU\¶VSDVWLQLWLDWLYHVFDQERRVWLWVinfluence. 
In contrast to the results of Birkinshaw et al.'s (2005) case study on Canadian subsidiaries, which 
showed how subsidiaries may gain power through maintaining close relations with their 
headquarters, our analysis does not support this association. We find that subsidiary-headquarters 
embeddedness can result in the creation of unique knowledge that may then serve as a means to 
bargaining power if it is informed to and acknowledged by the headquarters (Prahalad & Doz, 
1981). In addition, our results demonstrate that the existence of close relations between a subsidiary 
and its headquarters can considerably facilitate RKT. Therefore, close relations provide an 
opportunity for a subsidiary to showcase its capabilities, thereby enhancing its influence in the 
MNC.  
Our findings show that knowledge-based activities mediate the impact of network-based activities 
on influence. In particular, while external embeddedness is a strategic resource that can result in 
creating competency at both subsidiary and MNC level, it can also be a source of conflict. This is 
mainly due to the fact that a high level of external embeddedness may divert a subsidiary from the 
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whole agenda of its corporation and lead to distrust and conflict between subsidiary and 
headquarters (Asakawa, 2001). Therefore, through engaging in knowledge development and RKT, 
subsidiaries can not only demonstrate to headquarters that their agenda is in line with that of the 
MNC, but also increase their influence through raising awareness of their competencies and 
DWWUDFWLQJKHDGTXDUWHUV¶DWWHQWLRQ2XUUHVXOWVFRQILUPDQGDGGWRWKRVHRI$QGHUVVRQHWDO(2007), 
who demonstrate that external embeddedness can only affect influence positively if the subsidiary 
contributes to the MNC knowledge base. We provide more detail by showing that knowledge-based 
activities mediate the effect of external embeddedness.   
 
6.2. Managerial Relevance 
Our results have numerous practical implications for managers of MNCs. Subsidiary managers can 
LQFUHDVHWKHLUXQLW¶VLQIOXHQFHZLWKLQWKH01&E\SD\LQJPRUHDWWHQWLRQWR5.7WKLQNLQJFDUHIXOO\
about the type of knowledge that is both recognized and valued by the headquarters. Developing 
and maintaining external business relationships and developing own-knowledge do not constitute 
VXIILFLHQWDFWLRQVWRERRVWDVXEVLGLDU\¶VSRZHU-base. Due to the specific nature of the KIBS sector, 
the headquarters may not fully recognize the value of newly-created knowledge. Besides, such 
knowledge can only contribute to the MNC knowledge-base if it can be transferred, which may be 
tedious for tacit and localized knowledge. In this process, subsidiary managers need also to 
recognize and value internal embeddedness as a means to enhance their ability to develop 
knowledge that is more likely to be valued by and useful for the MNC. Managers in the services 
sector will more naturally acknowledge the central role of external embeddedness in strengthening 
their activities, whilst being less aware of ways in which internal embeddedness can also lead to 
influence. To conclude, relations with the headquarters are less important than those with local 
external business partners when it comes to developing new knowledge, but when facilitating RKT 
DQGHQKDQFLQJYLVLELOLW\WKH\FDQLQGLUHFWO\FRQWULEXWHWRDVXEVLGLDU\¶VSRZHU-base. 
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6.3. Implications for theory 
Our results contribute to the theoretical debate surrounding subsidiary influence in the context of 
WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO PDQDJHPHQW OLWHUDWXUH :H VKRZ WKDW ERWK D VXEVLGLDU\¶V NQRZOHGJH-based 
activities (RKT and knowledge development) and networking activities in the form of business 
relationships (internal and external embeddedness) must be considered to understand influence; and 
in particular, the role of these mechanisms cannot be considered in silos. Firstly, we demonstrate 
why not all knowledgeable subsidiaries exert influence within the MNC. For instance, the creation 
and possession of unique competencies do not necessarily lead to more influence. Both 
competencies and engagement in RKT are necessary conditions for subsidiaries to exert influence 
in the MNC. RKT activities provide an opportunity for subsidiaries to lobby headquarters for more 
influence by exercising a voice or engaging in issue-selling activities (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005). 
In the KIBS sector, where activities are highly context-specific, subsidiaries ought to engage in 
knowledge transfer; otherwise it will be very hard, if not impossible, for headquarters to understand 
and appreciate the value of the knowledge existing in the sub-unit. The interaction between 
knowledge-based and networking activities therefore provides a more complete explanation for 
subsidiary influence.  
 
6.4. Limitations and directions for future research 
7KHUHVXOWVRIRXUUHVHDUFKDOVRSRLQWWRVRPHOLPLWDWLRQV)LUVWWRH[SODLQVXEVLGLDULHV¶LQIOXHQFH
we focused on their business relations (both internal and external) and knowledge resources. Whilst 
knowledge creation or competencies are often used as proxy for subsidiary performance, such 
knowledge is not necessarily applicable or valuable to the MNC. Future research should consider 
types of knowledge in relation to the MNC knowledge base and explore further the complex issue 
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of influence and applicability of the knowledge transferred by a subsidiary. Second, the data was 
FROOHFWHGIURPVXEVLGLDULHV¶PDQDJHUVRQO\EHFDXVHRIWKHIRFXVRQVXEVLGLDU\-related mechanisms. 
While collecting data from headquarters and sister subsidiaries is considerably more difficult, it 
would enable integration of considerations inherent to other units. Moreover, in this study we 
examine the impacts of internal factors (knowledge- and network-EDVHGDFWLYLWLHVRQVXEVLGLDULHV¶
influence. However, the extent of subsidiary influence depends on the characteristics of both 
internal and external factors (e.g. national culture, location-specific resources, strategic importance 
of host country) (Ghemawat, 2001; Kessapidou & Varsakelis, 2002). Further research considering 
the impacts of external factors would provide deeper insights into subsidiary power-base. Finally, 
our data was collected during a period of economic turmoil in the UK. This may have affected 
VXEVLGLDU\WRSPDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHLURZQDELOLW\WRGHYHORSFRPSHWHQFLHVDQGLQIOXHQFH 
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Table 1: Constructs and their Indicators 
Indicators Mean SD Ȝ t-value R2-value 
Knowledge development, adapted from Andersson et al. (2005)Į $9( &5  
¾ Development of sales and marketing know-how 4.55 1.61 .77 11.63 .59 
¾ Development of distribution know-how  4.32 1.80 .73 10.75 .53 
¾ Development of service production strategy know-how 4.99 1.53 .83 12.88 .69 
¾ Development of management systems and practices know-
how 4.35 1.79 .68 9.74 .46 
Reverse knowledge transfer, taken from Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) and Yang et al. (2008)Į $9( 
.697, CR=.902 
¾ Transfer of  Sales and Marketing know-how 4.58 1.71 .72 10.94 .52 
¾ Transfer of  Strategy know-how 3.74 1.79 .87 14.58 .76 
¾ Transfer of  Distribution know-how 4.52 1.87 .85 13.93 .72 
¾ Transfer of  Management Systems and Practices know-how 4.05 1.76 .89 15.08 .79 
Influence, taken from Andersson et al.(2007) and Ahituv and Carmi (2007)Į $9(  .723, CR=.887 
The relative level of influence of the subsidiary on headquarters or 
sister subsidiaries decision-making 
¾ Decisions on new products/services 3.24 1.22 .87 14.02 .76 
¾ Determining and changing prices of services 3.20 1.21 .80 12.46 .64 
¾ Expanding/diminishing activities 3.26 1.22 .88 14.26 .77 
External embeddedness, adapted from Lane and Lubatkin (1998), Andersson et al. (2005), and Andersson et al. 
(2001), Į $9( &5  
Adaptation of the following practices from suppliers, customers, 
universities and competitors: 
¾ Adaptation in sales and marketing practices  
 
 
4.81 
 
 
1.49 
 
 
.65 
 
 
8.78 .42 
¾ Adaptation in distribution practices 4.57 1.48 .70 9.55 .49 
¾ Adaptation in management system and practices 4.56 1.46 .79 10.84 .62 
Subsidiary-headquarter embeddedness, adapted from Lane and Lubatkin (1998), Andersson et al. (2005), and 
Andersson et al. (2001)Į $9( &5  
Adaptation of the following practices from headquarter:      
¾ Adaptation in sales and marketing practices  4.54 1.65 .85 13.57 .72 
¾ Adaptation in distribution practices  4.54 1.70 .89 14.56 .79 
¾ Adaptation in management practices 4.73 1.58 .82 13.01 .67 
Tacitness, adapted from Simonin (2004), Į $9( &5  
¾ Sales and marketing knowledge is easily codifiable (can be 
easily documented in manuals and reports) 4.31 1.89 .73 10.71 .53 
¾ Strategy knowledge is easily codifiable (can be easily 
documented in manuals and reports) 4.69 1.85 .80 11.98 .64 
¾ Service production strategy knowledge is easily codifiable 
(can be easily documented in manuals and reports) 4.11 1.85 .74 10.79 .55 
¾ Management systems and practices knowledge is easily 
codifiable (can be easily documented in manuals and 
reports) 
4.77 1.7 .77 11.43 .59 
Fit Statistics:  F2= 282.01 (df=174), SRMR: 0.054, CFI= 0.96, NNFI= 0.96, IFI= 0.96, RMSEA= 0.058 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
Knowledge 
Development 
Reverse 
Knowledge 
Transfer 
Influence External Embeddedness 
 Subsidiary-
headquarter 
embeddedness 
Tacitness 
Knowledge Development .75      
Reverse Knowledge Transfer .60 .83     
Influence .16 .42 .85    
External Embeddedness .55 .32 .14 .71   
Subsidiary-headquarter 
embeddedness .38 .39 .22 .41 .85  
Tacitness .09 -.16 .01 .01 -.01 .76 
Bold numbers on the diagonal show the AVE 
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Figure 1. Theoretical framework 
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Table 3: Results of Hypothesis Testing 
 Hypotheses Paths Estimates t-value 
D
ire
ct
 
re
la
tio
ns
 H1 External embeddednessÆInfluence .07 .59 Subsidiary-headquarter embeddednessÆInfluence .07 .8 
H2 RKTÆInfluence .49 4.41** 
Knowledge development (KD)ÆInfluence -.20 -1.58 
M
ed
ia
tin
g 
ef
fe
ct
s 
H3 
External embeddednessÆ RKT -.07 -.75 
External embeddednessÆ KD .47 4.92** 
Subsidiary-headquarter embeddednessÆ RKT .2 2.54** 
Subsidiary-headquarter embeddednessÆ KD .19 2.23** 
Note: In line with earlier studies (e.g. Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Håkanson & Nobel, 2001), our model 
finds a positive significant relationship between knowledge development and RKT (.56, 5.24) 
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Table 4: Results from Jack-Knife Tests 
. 
Final model 
factor loadings 
(std errors) 
Germany 
(n=160) 
France 
(n=159) 
USA 
(n=120) 
Large 
(n=156) 
Small 
(n=156) 
Young 
(n=156) 
Old 
(n=156) 
External embeddednessÆInfluence .07 (.11) .09 .07 -.05 .06 .20 .08 .16 
Subsidiary- headquarter 
embeddednessÆInfluence .07 (.09) .18 .13 .08 .05 .06 .11 -.01 
RKTÆInfluence .49 (.11) .51 .48 .5 .47 .44 .56 .56 
KDÆInfluence -.2(.13) -.26 -.23 -.14 -.2 -.21 -.31 -.24 
External embeddednessÆ RKT -.07(.1) -.05 -.16 -.02 -.13 -.05 -.11 -.08 
External embeddednessÆ KD .47 (.1) .49 .49 .45 .49 .45 .46 .48 
Subsidiary-headquarter 
embeddednessÆ RKT .2 (.08) .18 .26 .22 .22 .16 .2 .18 
Subsidiary-headquarter 
embeddednessÆ KD .19 (.09) .19 .17 .2 .21 .2 .24 .17 
Tacitness .06 (.08) .09 .04 .07 .05 .01 .07 .04 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Novel Conceptual Framework 
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